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Basel III introduces for the first time an international framework for liquidity risk regulation, reflecting the 
experience of excessive liquidity risk taking of banks in the run up to the financial crisis that erupted in August 
2007, and associated negative externalities. As central banks play a crucial role in the liquidity provision to 
banks during normal times and in a financial crisis, the treatment of central bank operations in the regulation is 
obviously important. To ensure internalisation of liquidity risks (i.e. pricing of liquidity risk) and to address 
excessive reliance ex ante on central bank liquidity support by the banks, the regulation deliberately does not 
establish a direct close link with the monetary policy operational framework. While this reflects the purpose of 
the regulation and is also natural outcome of an international rule being applied under a multitude of very 
different monetary policy operational frameworks, this paper shows that the interaction between the two areas 
can be substantial, depending on the operational and collateral framework of the central bank. This implies the 
need for further study and the development of policies at the central bank and regulatory/supervisory side on 
how to handle these potential interactions in practice.             
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Basel III introduces for the first time an international framework for liquidity risk regulation, 
reflecting the experience of excessive liquidity risk taking and serious flaws in liquidity risk 
management of banks in the run up to the financial crisis that erupted in August 2007, and associated 
negative externalities. As central banks play a crucial role in the liquidity provision to banks during 
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   normal times and in a financial crisis, the treatment of central bank operations in the regulation is 
obviously important. The regulation does not in its entirety recognise the various central bank 
frameworks and operations; first, given that it is an international rule applied under a variety of very 
different monetary policy operational frameworks and, second, to achieve its purpose of liquidity risk 
pricing and address undue reliance of banks on central banks.  However, this paper shows that this 
separated treatment of the liquidity risk regulation and central bank operations framework can lead to 
some specific interactions that are not necessarily positive from a monetary policy and financial 
stability perspective. Berg (2010) puts the issue  in a provocative way: “The new international 
liquidity standards have thus far been set with a blatant disregard for the interaction with central bank 
collateral rules. The inherent conflict between the two is likely to surface”. We argue that while the 
idea behind the new liquidity regulation to require banks to raise funding at their own capacities on 
financial markets and thereby internalise liquidity risk is a legitimate one, the interaction with central 
bank liquidity provision is indeed substantial and will require further study and policy development 
across the regulatory, supervisory and central bank communities.     
With a view to address these negative interactions through specific policies, this note proceeds as 
follows. First, section 2 recalls the motivation behind the new liquidity risk regulation. Section 3 
explains the role of the central bank operational framework, and in particular the collateral framework, 
for the funding liquidity of banks. In addition the section takes a normative perspective and discusses 
the reasoning behind the central bank’s supportive role of bank funding in a financial crisis. Section 4 
simulates in a simple way the interaction between the new regulatory framework and monetary policy 
operations of central banks, to provide examples of tensions between the two. Section 5 studies how 
central bank policies influence the ability of banks to fulfil the new liquidity regulation. Section 6 
briefly describes some preliminary approaches to address the identified negative interactions. Section 
7 concludes.  
 
2. The new liquidity regulation 
 
2.1 The crisis experiences 
The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 and ravaged through most developed financial 
markets resulted from extra-ordinary growth in credit and leverage (Financial Stability Forum, 2008). 
The period before the crisis was characterised by highly benign and reinforcing economic and 
financial conditions, as reflected by low interest rates and spreads, low volatility and low levels of risk 
aversion. These conditions increased the level of risk and leverage which borrowers, investors and 
other financial actors were willing to take. Financial innovation had a significant impact on this 
process: e.g. credit risk became tradable and easier to hedge, increasing the liquidity of credit assets (at 
that time). The reinforcing cycle was also fed by the provision of off-balance sheet funding and the 
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banks to increase their reliance on the sale of marketable securities to raise funding and, in addition, 
provided the market conditions for banks to become more reliant on interbank borrowing (of which a 
large part was concentrated at the shorter term). 
 
From the end of 2006 and early 2007 the worsening underwriting standards began to clearly affect the 
delinquencies of US subprime mortgages, investor’s growing awareness of the increasing 
delinquencies started to hit indices based on subprime-related assets. These price falls produced losses 
and margin calls for investors in securitised products collateralised by subprime mortgages. 
Additionally, heavy mass downgrades by Credit Rating Agencies of structured products backed by 
subprime mortgages led to severe loss of investor confidence in a broader set of structured credit. This 
translated in money market investors unwilling to roll-over investments in asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) backed by structured credit of conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) in 
August 2007. The sponsoring banks of the conduits and SIVs started to hoard their liquidity resources 
and became unwilling to provide liquidity to other market players as they had to fulfil their liquidity 
commitments to ABCP conduits and SIVs. This led to a severe contraction of activity in the term 
interbank market. These events implied the definite end and reversal of the positive reinforcing cycle 
that characterised the financial and economic conditions. By October 2008, interbank lending in the 
US and in Europe had come to a virtual stand-still.  
 
The sharp reduction in liquidity for structured credit had severe repercussions. It resulted in 
problematic valuation conditions of structured credit, hedging difficulties, the requirement to finance 
the structured credit by more long term funding and increased loss of confidence in assessing total 
credit exposures as concerns grew regarding the quality of the wider set of credit assets. In some cases 
these conditions required firms to outright sell securities or take off-setting positions, thereby also 
affecting different asset classes. Overall market events posed severe stress to capital and liquidity 
bases, raising general counterparty risk concerns between financial players. The heightened 
counterparty concerns required unprecedented crisis intervention by central banks to stabilize the 
interbank, foreign currency swap, and secured money market fall-out and restore their functioning 
(IMF 2008 and 2010).  
 
2.2 Main lessons to learn - a liquidity risk perspective 
A key aspect of the crisis has been the over reliance of commercial and investment banks (as well as 
entities of the shadow banking system) on short-term market funding to finance asset of longer-term 
holding periods. The roll-over of the short-term market funding to finance illiquid assets showed too 
fragile and to heavily rely on market confidence. As firms could no longer fund their activities they 
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(Financial Stability Forum, 2008). 
  
This over reliance on short term market funding resulted from faulty assumptions regarding asset 
liquidity or from the plain disregard of market liquidity risk as well as from moral hazard with respect 
to the role of central banks as lenders and liquidity providers of last resort. The growth of 
securitization and credit risk transfer made firms more dependent on market conditions to access 
funding. However, market illiquidity can pose severe funding difficulties to firms as they are unable or 
have it more difficult to roll-over maturing funding or liquefying assets through repos and outright 
sales or face cash drains through increasing margin requirements. In addition, market developments 
made that the composition of this funding had also changed, intermediaries such as money market 
mutual funds became important suppliers of funding in contrast to more stable depositors (IMF 2008 
and 2010). The risks resulting from the assumption of effective, efficient and continuous markets, the 
wider use of short-term wholesale funding markets and greater maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities were not fully appreciated by most financial players.     
 
In addition, the provision of liquidity and credit lines to off-balance sheet vehicles, that invest in long-
term assets and borrow with short-term funding, actually brought the maturity mismatch risk back to 
the banks (Brunnermeier 2009). The changing activities showed to pose many other forms of 
contingent liquidity risk to financial institutions.  The contingent liquidity risk is introduced through a 
variety of options that are explicitly or implicitly embedded in financial contracts (from retail loans to 
derivative transactions). The crisis experiences showed a clear failure at many financial firms to 
appropriately assess the risks and price the contingent liquidity risk from these options. This incorrect 
risk assessment and pricing made that some financial firms faced extreme unexpected collateral calls 
requiring unanticipated needs for contingent funding during the crisis. Many financial firms also 
misjudged the importance of reputational risks that arise from explicit and implicit commitments of 
off-balance sheet vehicles. 
 
Also the reliance on foreign currency markets was affected by disruptions in the swap market (from 
increased counterparty concerns) making some cross-border banks having difficulties to match their 
specific currency liquidity requirements with the currency in which they had their available cash. 
 
2.3 The regulatory liquidity risk framework 
The crisis experiences showed that many fragilities at financial institutions accounted for the deep 
financial crisis (deficiencies of corporate governance, risk management and internal control). One of 
the critical issues that have been identified has been the inadequacy of the liquidity risk management 
in many financial firms (Senior Supervisors Group, 2008 and 2009). In reaction, to raise the standards 
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issued their “Principles for Sound Liquidity risk Management and Supervision” in 2008 (BCBS, 
2008). In addition, to strengthen the resilience of international banks to liquidity shocks and to further 
harmonise the liquidity risk supervision, the G20 requested the Basel Committee to define a liquidity 
risk framework that would promote stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions. The liquidity 
risk framework has been issued, as part of the Basel III regulatory reform package on 16 December 
2010 (BCBS 2010).   
 
The liquidity risk framework consists of two main measures that have as purpose to raise the resilience 
of financial firms to liquidity shocks and address the fragilities identified by the crisis. The measures 
are complemented with a minimum set of monitoring tools to address certain specific or other 
dimensions of liquidity risk .  
 
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) has as purpose to establish a minimum level of high quality 
liquid assets to withstand an acute stress scenario lasting one month. The stress scenario is a regulatory 
defined stress composed of “a conservative bank level and plausible severe system wide shock”. 
Provided the balance sheet and the firm’s activities this stress defines the potential net cash drain.  To 
determine the cash flow drain every source of liquidity risk has to be regarded which could affect the 
liquidity position of the financial firm. For instance, margin requirements from derivative transactions 
and liquidity support to conduits through committed facilities are captured within the measure. The 
liquidity buffer thus has to enable the firm to survive through a cash flow drain that results from a 
stress lasting one month. By requesting the liquidity buffer to consist of high quality liquid assets, 
which provide relatively low yields, the measure internalises the liquidity risks from the activities of 
the banks, as holding the high quality liquid assets is costly to the bank.  
 
The second measure, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), is a more structural measure and has as 
purpose to ensure that the longer-term assets or activities are funded by more stable medium or longer-
term liability and equity financing. The ratio is a more structural funding measure as it relates the 
maturity structure of the asset side with the liability side of the balance sheet. In broad, it requires that 
longer term assets are financed by funding of one year and more. The measure thus links the available 
stability of the funding with the required stability of the asset, or in other words, the illiquidity of the 
assets or activities of the firm. 
 
Both measures clearly address the fragilities identified by the crisis and strive to increase the resilience 
of banks to liquidity shocks by establishing minimum levels of buffers and by structurally matching 
more closely the term structure of both sides of the balance sheet. This increased resilience will make 
that firms e.g. do not have to resort to fire sales as last measure when they can no longer fund their 
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following sections the focus will be on the interactions between the LCR measure and monetary 
policy. For a more detailed discussion of both regulatory measures we refer to the regulatory Basel III 
text “International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring” (BCBS 
2010). 
 
2.4 The liquidity risk coverage ratio in more detail 
The LCR measure makes a comparison between the liquidity buffer and the net cash outflow over a 
30-day period. Or more specifically the ratio is defined as:  
 
  1





outflow cash net days
assets encumbered non liquid
LCR  
The LCR standard would require that the ratio is no lower than 100%.  
 
We start this section with a discussion of the definition of liquid assets under the new regulation. 
Second, we shortly discuss how cash outflows and inflows over the 30-day period are determined in 
the regulation and particularly focus on the elements that interact with the monetary policy operations. 
 
2.4.1. Definition of liquidity buffer 
The new regulation defines two categories of liquid assets. Level 1 liquid assets are mainly composed 
of cash and central bank reserves
2 and government and public sector entity debt qualifying for the 0% 
risk weight under the Basel II standardised approach. The qualifying assets are subject to general 
additional criteria of being traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets, proven record of a 
reliable source of liquidity even during stressed conditions and the assets cannot be an obligation of a 
financial institution
3. For sovereigns that do not have a 0% risk weight, the inclusion of domestic 
sovereign debt is allowed in the local currency as well as the foreign currency
4. The level 1 assets are 
further also required to “ideally be central bank eligible for intraday liquidity needs and overnight 
liquidity facilities in a jurisdiction and currency where the bank has access to the central bank”. The 
level 2 liquid assets mainly consist of government and public sector entity debt qualifying for the 20% 
                                                 
2 To the extent that the reserves can be drawn in times of stressed conditions. 
3 These criteria are of utmost importance as it is not an asset on itself that will determine whether it is “liquid”, however, it is 
the market in which it is traded that will determine its liquidity value. Hence, to increase the liquidity resilience of banks, 
regulators should also improve the transparency, robustness and resilience of the markets. In addition, when assessing the 
liquidity position also the state and development of the markets in which the banks liquid assets are traded should be 
considered. 
4 To the extent that the foreign currency matches the currency needs of the bank’s operations in that jurisdiction. 
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bonds cannot be issued by a financial institution or by the bank itself and must have at least a AA- 
credit rating assigned. As for the level 1 assets the same criteria hold for the level 2 assets; namely that 
the securities have to be traded in large, deep, liquid and active repo or cash markets, must have a 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity and meet central bank eligibility for intraday liquidity 
needs and overnight liquidity facilities. The level 2 assets can comprise no more than 40% of the 
liquidity buffer. This cap also comprises the cash and other level 1 assets that would be financed 
through secured funding transactions that would mature within the 30-day period. A 15% haircut has 
to be applied to the market value of the level 2 liquid assets.    
 
This definition of liquid assets, which constitute the liquidity buffer, results from the purpose of 
limiting the set of assets to those assets that most likely will allow banks to generate liquidity during a 
period of stress (e.g. through repo markets). This relates to a basic notion of the regulation that the 
firm has to rely on its own capacities to raise necessary funding. Moreover, requiring high quality 
liquid assets poses a cost to the firm to hold the buffer so that the liquidity risk is internalised within 
the bank (or put differently the regulation requires banks to price their liquidity risk).  However, the 
list of liquid assets cannot be defined too narrowly as this could entail concentration risks, resulting in 
extreme volatility of the value of the liquidity buffer or liquidity raising capacity and systemic risks. 
To allow fulfilling these objectives and to ensure that the regulation establishes a ‘stability buffer’ 
before reliance on central bank support, the definition of liquid assets purposefully does not equal the 
respective central bank’s eligible collateral framework of the respective jurisdiction.  This approach 
has been acknowledged by the IMF (2010) “to encourage appropriate pricing of liquidity risk in good 
times to limit its negative impact in times of market stress” and is also in line with a CGFS 2008 report 
that proposes to address concerns of over-reliance of banks on central bank “a possible offset would be 
to implement tighter supervisory and prudential policies concerning the management of liquidity…”.  
 
2.4.2 Net cash outflows 
This section briefly discusses the treatment of cash in and outflows in the regulation and particularly 
focuses on the treatment of the in and outflows of monetary policy operations.  
 
To determine the cash outflows (inflows) of the liabilities (assets), stress (run-off) factors are applied 
according to the characteristics of the assets, liabilities and the counterparties. Funding is categorised 
along retail deposits, unsecured wholesale funding, secured funding and categories that comprise of, 
for instance, contingent funding liabilities. These categories and subcategories of funding receive run-
off factors according to the “stickiness” of the liabilities. With respect to funding obtained through 
operations with the central bank the regulation foresees the following treatment. Unsecured central 
bank funding receives a run-off rate of 75%, in other words the funding that is to mature within the 30 
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rates according to the quality of the underlying collateral. Secured funding backed by Level 1 assets is 
assumed to be extended (and no run-off rate applies), funding backed by Level 2 assets receives a cash 
outflow or run-off of 15% and central bank secured funding collateralised by other assets than Level 1 
and Level 2 assets are assumed to run-off at a rate of 25%.    
 
The regulation applies a limitation to the recognition of inflows at the general level to prevent banks to 
unduly rely on unrealistic assumptions of cash inflows to meet the liquidity requirements. The total 
amount of inflows that can cover outflows is limited to 75% of total outflows, this establishes a 
minimum level of liquidity buffer (of 25% of outflows). In addition, relative limits to counterparties 
have been introduced as well. Inflows from retail customers can maximally be 50% of contractual 
inflows, inflows from non-financial wholesale counterparties are also limited to 50% of contractual 
inflows and inflows from financial institutions are limited to 100%. 
 
2.5 Next steps in the implementation of the regulation 
The introduction of both liquidity risk standards as minimum requirements is subject to careful 
assessment of the impact of the regulation on banks, financial markets and the wider economy. The 
assessment of the measures will be performed during the so-called observation periods. The 
observation period for the LCR would span until end of 2014, for the LCR to be introduced as a 
minimum requirement by January 1
st 2015. The NSFR would follow and would be introduced by 
January 1
st 2018.  
 
 
3. Central bank as liquidity providers to banks 
 
This section explains that central banks are crucial liquidity providers to banks in normal times and 
even more in times of financial crisis. This holds at the aggregate level but also at an individual bank 
level. This crucial function of liquidity provider in normal times is explained through the concept of 
the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central bank (subsection 3.1). The availability 
of central bank eligible collateral determines the related central bank borrowing potential, so the role 
of collateral eligibility is introduced (subsection 3.2). The section then turns from the aggregate 
banking system perspective to the perspective of individual banks and their funding liquidity risk 
(subsection 3.3). The section also reviews, as an example, central bank collateral availability in the 
case of the euro area (subsection 3.4). Finally, the last subsection introduces the crucial role of central 
banks as liquidity providers during stressed conditions.  
 
  83.1 The liquidity deficit of the banks is determined by the central bank balance sheet 
As the previous section discusses, the new regulation assumes that the firm in first instance should rely 
on its own capacities to raise funding and not to rely on central bank funding. However, to qualify this 
assumption, it is important to recall the logic of the banks’ funding dependence on the central bank, 
both at an aggregate and at an individual level. The liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the 
central bank is what the banks need to finance from the central bank on a regular basis through 
collateralized credit operations. As will be illustrated further in particular in section 5, the liquidity 
deficit of the banking system is not irrelevant in determining the liquidity of banks as measured 
through the LCR, while at the same time the liquidity deficit is not directly related to any liquidity risk 
measure of individual banks.  It is crucial to note that the liquidity deficit of banks vis-à-vis the central 
bank is determined by decisions of economic agents other than the banks. This contrasts with the 
potential assumption that the liquidity deficit is determined by the banking system, and that incentives 
applied to banks would suffice to reduce it to make banks independent of the central bank.  
The starting point of the banking system’s liquidity deficit is, maybe surprisingly, the household, who 
holds first only real assets, but then diversifies into financial assets. We build the understanding of the 
liquidity deficit of banks in three steps. The liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central 
bank is presented within a closed system of financial accounts including the households, the banking 
system, the corporate sector, and the central bank.  
 
Step 1: households diversify from real assets into banknotes, whereby the freed real assets are 
held by corporates. Our system of financial accounts consists of two “real” sectors, namely 
households and corporates, and two financial sectors, the banks and the central bank. The latter two do 
not hold real assets, but only financial assets. Moreover, the central bank wants to transact only with 
the banking system. At the beginning, only the household holds real assets equal to its equity (E). The 
corporate sector will hold real assets equal to what the household does not want to hold from its initial 
endowment, which is what the household has diversified into financial assets. Corporates are, in the 
simplest case, financed only via banks. In step 1, the bank finances only through the central bank, 
namely an amount equal to banknotes in circulation (B). One may imagine that the bank first borrows 
the banknotes from the central bank, then exchanges them with the household against real assets, and 
then sells the real assets to the corporates, who refinance them through loans from the bank.  
 




Real assets     E-B 
Equity   E 
   
Corporate 
Real assets     B  Liabilities to the banks                 B 
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Bank 
Claims to corporate                           B  CB borrowing   B 
 
Central bank 
Borrowing to banks                           B  Banknotes   B 
 
Step 2: households diversify into deposits. When households want to diversify their assets further, 
namely into deposits with banks (D), then this necessarily frees additional real assets for the corporate 
sector. The volume of household deposits increases correspondingly the length of the bank’s and the 
corporate’s balance sheet.  
 
Step 3: outright holdings of corporate bonds by the central bank. One can now introduce central 
bank outright holdings, and it is assumed in this example that these outright holdings are claims 
against corporates in the form of corporate bonds ( ). This direct refinancing of the corporates by 
the central bank (i) reduces the need of the corporate to refinance through the bank and (ii) thereby 
reduces the need of the bank to refinance through the central bank.  
CB CC
After steps 2 and 3, the closed system of financial accounts of the four economic sectors takes the 




Deposits bank                                
Bank D
Real assets     E- -B 
Bank D
Equity   E 
   
Corporate 
Real assets  + B 
Bank D Liabilities to the banks               + B-  
Bank D
CB CC








Deposits of HH    
Bank D




Claims to corporates                          
CB CC
Borrowing to banks                       B-  
CB CC




What needs to be retained in the present context is that banknotes in circulation (determined by the 
household) and the decisions of the central bank to hold assets outright mechanically determine the 
dependence on the banking system of the central bank. By introducing additional sectors (e.g. the 
Government and the rest of the world), and by introducing links between these sectors and the ones 
depicted above, additional influences on the liquidity deficit arise, but the conclusion that those are 
exogenous to the banking system remains. 
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It should be noted that the logic above does not exclude that a banking system could be in a liquidity 
surplus vis-à-vis the central bank, namely if the central bank buys more corporate bonds than the 
amount of banknotes demanded by the household. When the central bank buys corporate bonds from 
the corporates (say with banknotes), the corporates will use the proceeds to pay back their loans from 
banks, and the banks will hold banknotes that they will return to the central bank, which credits their 
sight accounts correspondingly. The implied excess deposits of banks with the central bank would 
drive short term interbank interest rates to zero, unless the central bank would absorb them through 
some liquidity absorbing operations, or by imposing reserve requirements. In many countries, the 
banking system is actually in a liquidity surplus vis-à-vis the central bank as the central bank holds 
large amounts of claims against the rest of the world – namely foreign reserves.   
 
If one accepts the fact of an exogenous liquidity deficit of the banking system, and the huge cross-
country diversity of this measure due to e.g. diversity of banknote demand by households and of 
central bank policies with regard to outright holdings of assets, one is tempted to conclude that a 
liquidity regulation (which is partly motivated by reducing dependence of banks from the central 
bank) without any reference to this concept may be in danger to overlook an important dimension. 
 
Also the need for central bank eligible collateral will depend on the size of the liquidity deficit. For 
instance, if a banking system operates in a liquidity surplus, then there are little reasons for the central 
bank to make eligible a large set of collateral. If in contrast the liquidity deficit to be covered through 
reverse operations is huge, then the central bank must ensure substantial collateral availability. Also, 
when business models of banks are diverse, and if inter-bank liquidity shocks tend to be substantial, 
there are more reasons to allow for a large set of eligible collateral.  
 
The diversity of liquidity deficits and of collateral frameworks implies that applying a uniform 
liquidity regulation to all banks internationally, in the absence of ‘compensatory’ adjustments of the 
operational and collateral frameworks of central banks, would lead to different incentives for banks 
across jurisdictions.. Conceptually, there are four alternatives to deal with these costs of regulation: 
First, to accept differences across jurisdictions.. Second, to adjust the collateral and operational 
frameworks of central banks with the aim to minimize distortions. Third, to allow for flexibility of 
liquidity rules across jurisdiction and fourth a combination of the above. The following sections 
illustrate that ignoring central bank collateral eligibility is not a way to ensure a level playing field.  
 
3.2. Central bank collateral eligibility and haircuts 
A second key aspect of central bank operations that affects the funding of banks is the collateral 
framework of the central bank. Let   be the vector of assets of a certain bank, so for  } ,... , { 2 1 n a a a A 
  11instance   is deposits with the central bank, while   could be idiosyncratic impaired loans, whereby 
also different maturities could constitute different elements of the array.   
1 a n a
 
On each of these assets, the central bank decides on collateral eligibility, and for the eligible ones, it 
decides on a haircut. Let the array of central bank haircuts be  } ,..., , { 2 1 n ch ch ch CH  , with 
. Haircuts of 1 are equivalent to a non-eligibility of the respective assets. 
The total central bank borrowing potential of the representative bank is 
therefore . A part of the borrowing potential may be used already through central 
bank borrowing or through repoing in private markets. Usually, the central bank eligible set of assets 
will be larger than the one in the interbank market because haircuts are available as an effective risk 
mitigation tool to the central bank, while it is not an effective tool if both counterparties in the deal are 
similarly of relevant credit risk (see also section 3.5).   
0 ... 1 1 2     ch ch n n
  
i




The setting-up of a central bank’s collateral set and associated risk control framework has to take into 
account the uneven suitability of financial assets for use as central bank collateral and their ex ante 
heterogeneous risk properties. The following specific five-step approach was proposed by Bindseil 
and Papadia (2000) (see also Chailloux et al 2008): 
1. First, a list of all asset types that could be eligible as collateral in central bank credit operations has 
to be established. The assets in the list will have different risk characteristics (liquidity, transparency, 
correlation with systemic economic risk factors, existence of a market to establish market valuations, 
ability of the central bank to calculate theoretical values, etc.), which implies that different risk 
mitigation measures are needed to deal with them. 
2. The specific aim of risk mitigation measures is to bring the residual risks that are associated with 
the different types of assets to the same level, namely the level that the central bank is ready to accept.  
Risk mitigation measures are costly and, since they have to be differentiated across asset types
5, their 
                                                 
5 Since the risk associated with collateralized operations depends, before the application of credit risk mitigation 
measures, on the type of collateral used, the risk mitigation measures will need to be differentiated according to 
the collateral type to ensure consistent compliance with the defined risk tolerance of the central bank. The 
following three risk mitigation measures are typically used in collateralized lending operations. (1) Valuation 
and margin calls: collateral needs to be valued accurately to ensure that the amount of central bank money 
provided to the counterparty does not exceed the collateral value. As asset prices fluctuate over time, collateral 
needs to be revalued regularly, and new collateral needs to be called in whenever a certain trigger level is 
reached. (2) Haircuts: in case of counterparty default, the collateral submitted by that counterparty needs to be 
sold. This takes some time and, for less liquid markets, a sale in the shortest possible time would have a negative 
impact on prices. To reduce the probability of losses at liquidation, a certain percentage of the collateral value 
needs to be deducted when accepting the collateral, to establish what amount of central bank reserves can be 
provided in exchange of the collateral. (3)Limits: to avoid concentration, limits may be imposed, which can 
typically take one of the following two forms: (i) Limits for exposures to individual counterparties (e.g. limits to 
the volume of refinancing provided to a single counterparty). (ii) Limits to the use of specific collateral by single 
counterparties: e.g. percentage or absolute limits per issuer or per asset type can be imposed. 
 
  12costs will also differ. The same applies to handling costs: some types of collateral will be more costly 
to handle than others. Thus, the fact that risk mitigation measures can reduce residual risks for a given 
asset to the desired level, is not sufficient to conclude that such an asset should be made eligible. This 
also requires the risk mitigation measures and the general handling of such a type of collateral to be 
cost effective, as addressed in the next two steps. 
3. The potential collateral types should be ranked in increasing order of cost, whereby the ranking 
should reflect the collateral value per unit after haircut. 
4. The central bank has to choose a cut-off line in the ranked assets on the basis of a comprehensive 
cost–benefit analysis, matching the marginal social benefits of central bank collateral with its 
increasing marginal cost. The social benefits of enlarging the collateral set are very high at the 
beginning, because a too small collateral set interferes with a smooth monetary policy implementation 
and the implied lack of liquidity buffers in the form of central bank borrowing potential is detrimental 
to financial stability. The larger the collateral set, the less likely it is that liquidity absorbing shocks to 
individual banks or to the banking system as a whole exhaust the collateral buffers. Therefore, the 
marginal value of further increases of collateral buffers become lower and lower, when the eligible 
collateral set grows. On the other side, as the collateral types are ranked in this exercise from the most 
convenient and hence cheapest to use, to the least convenient ones (which are expensive to provide, 
difficult to risk manage and to handle; which need to be made subject to high haircuts, etc), the 
marginal cost curve of widening the collateral set increases. In view of the decreasing marginal social 
benefits, and the increasing social cost of widening the central bank collateral set, a unique optimum 
can be identified.    
5. Finally, the central bank has to monitor how the counterparties use the opportunities provided by the 
framework, in particular which collateral they use and how much concentration risk results from their 
choices. The actual collateral use by counterparties, while being very difficult to anticipate, determines 
the residual credit risks borne by the central bank. If actual risks deviate much from expectations due 
to unexpected collateral use practices, then there may be a need to revise the framework accordingly. 
The central bank cannot (and should not) protect itself at 100% from risks, since some extremely 
unlikely events may always lead to a loss (e.g. the sudden simultaneous defaults of both the 
counterparty and the issuer of the collateral). Therefore, some optimal risk tolerance of the central 
bank needs to be defined and adequate mitigation measures must be derived from it.  
In sum, the central bank collateral framework and risk control measures should be designed in a 
rational way in which social costs and benefits of collateral eligibility should be balanced.  
 
3.3 Individual banks’ liquidity management and liquidity risk 
Now, we bring together the system of financial accounts establishing the liquidity deficit of the 
banking system vis-à-vis the central bank, with the role of central bank collateral eligibility, and at the 
same time switch from a pure macro- to a micro-economic perspective.  
  13To describe the funding stress at banks, we need to modify the representation given in the financial 
accounts above by representing individual banks and their respective sources of liquidity stress. The 
simplest way for this is as follows. We assume that the central bank holds only claims to banks equal 
to banknotes (i.e. it does not hold corporate bonds). However, banks now hold separate deposits with 
two banks, and there are two sorts of liquidity shocks, an aggregate shock η, and a deposit shift shock 
μ (see also Bindseil 2011). We can assume those shocks to follow a certain probability distribution. 
For instance, we could assume very simply that both are independently normal distributed with 
expected value of zero and standard deviation      , . 
  
Household 
Banknotes B0 + η 
Deposits bank                        - η/2 + μ 
1 Bank D
Deposits bank                        - η/2 - μ 
2 Bank D
Real assets                     E- - B0 
2 1 Bank Bank D D 
Equity   E 
   
Corporate Sector 
Real assets                      +  + B0 
1 Bank D





Loans to corporate                 + B0/2 
1 Bank D
 
Deposits of HH   - η/2 + μ 
1 Bank D
CB borrowing  B0/2 + η/2 - μ 
 
Bank 2 
Loans to corporate                 + B0/2 
1 Bank D
 
Deposits of HH   - η/2 - μ  
2 Bank D
CB borrowing  B0/2 + η/2 - μ 
 
Central bank 




Liquidity buffers of banks may be defined either as a deterministic or as a stochastic concept. A 
deterministic concept is, for instance, “Distance to Fire Sales” = DFS = the maximum amount of 
deposit withdrawals that a bank can handle within a certain time horizon before having to fire-sale 
corporate loans. We will come back to this concept later. A stochastic concept would be “Probability 
of liquidity” = PL = the probability that the bank does not need to fire-sale assets in a certain time 
horizon. To a certain extent the LCR may be interpreted along such a stochastic concept, as it refers to 
a stress scenario. This stress scenario is a sort of tail event, which is assumed to have a certain 
likelihood.  The regulation requires that a bank should be able to withstand the specified tail event, i.e. 
the event of illiquidity has a required probability (1-PL) below the assumed probability of the stress 
event underlying the LCR.  In the simple model above, liquidity buffers must follow from the 
eligibility of corporate loans for central bank operations. Indeed, the banks must refinance in total the 
amount B from the central bank, and as central bank funding is always collateralised, it seems that in 
  14this example the central bank must have accepted corporate loans as collateral. Only few central banks 
do that in fact, and those, like the Eurosystem, who do it, impose relatively high haircuts on corporate 
loans.  Two techniques can be employed by banks to increase the two liquidity measures (DFS and 
PL) in this simple model:  
  Transform a part of the corporate loans into ABS or corporate bonds (the latter needs to be done 
at the initiative of the corporates). This requires some investments in terms of increased 
transparency, legal documentation, listing fees, etc. There is an increasing marginal cost in doing 
so, as the corporate claims are suitable for that to a different extent (transforming the small loan to 
the bakery next door is prohibitive). The advantage of corporate bonds (or ABS) is that, if they are 
high quality, they can (i) be sold at relatively limited discounts (lower discounts than those of a 
loan book that is liquidated under stress) in the case of a funding crisis (in particular if the origin 
of the crisis is not related to the corporate sector); (ii) be submitted with the central bank as 
collateral, at lower haircuts than corporate loans (who are mostly not eligible at all).  
  Transform a part of the household deposits into long term deposits. Again, this comes at some 
cost, as the households have a preference for short term deposits that they can withdraw every day.    
 
By assuming concrete marginal costs for the two types of activities, and for assuming concrete costs of 
illiquidity, one can calculate the level of liquidity that the banks will choose. By adding also a model 
of systemic externality, one can determine the degree of under-investment into liquidity, and hence the 
need to impose a higher degree of liquidity through regulation.  In reality, there is of course a large 
variety of assets and liabilities, which are all distinct in terms of their properties relevant for the 
overall funding liquidity of the bank. For assets, the main properties are asset liquidity and central 
bank repo eligibility, while for liabilities, it is maturity and likelihood of roll over at maturity. For all 
these properties, stress scenarios need to be considered. One may assume that the less liquid the asset, 
the higher the expected remuneration, everything else equal (since the more liquid assets provide by 
definition an extra service, which in market equilibrium will lead to a higher price, and hence a lower 
yield). Therefore, from a return point of view, banks have a preference for holding less liquid assets. 
Still, they diversify and hold some more liquid assets because they acknowledge liquidity risk. 
However, at the same time, they ignore the negative systemic externalities of liquidity stress, and 
hence tend to hold less liquid assets than in the social optimum (see also IMF 2010). The same holds 
for the maturity and likelihood of roll over at maturity of bank liabilities.  
 
3.4 Collateral availability: the case of the euro area 
To assess the role of central bank collateral eligibility for the funding liquidity of banks, we consider 
the case of the euro area. Four concepts have to be distinguished in terms of central bank collateral 
availability: 
  15  Total eligible collateral: these are all eligible marketable assets that have been issued. The 
following table provides an overview for Eurosystem eligible securities issued, as at end 







bn euro)   
% over 
total 
Central Government  5,420 41.0%
Regional Government  341 2.6%
Covered bank bonds  1,378 10.4%
Corporate bonds  1,398 10.6%
Unsecured bank bonds  2,853 21.6%
ABS 1,337 10.1%
Other marketable assets  491 3.7%
Total   13,219 100.0%
 
 
  Total eligible collateral held by banks with access to Eurosystem credit operations: large 
parts of eligible securities may be held by non-banks, and may therefore be unavailable to 
banks as source of liquidity.  
  Total unencumbered collateral held by banks with access to Eurosystem credit operations. 
Eligible central bank assets may be encumbered either by being already used to secure central 
bank credit, or by being used to collateralise intra-bank liabilities (repos or exposures 
resulting from OTC derivatives). While the central bank credit of the banks is known - it 
stood at EUR 754 billion at end December 2009 - the amount of collateral used to secure 
interbank liabilities is estimated to be in the order of EUR 350 billion (at end 2009 – see ECB 
monthly bulletin).    
  Total collateral posted by banks with the Eurosystem: this is what the banks have actually 
transferred to the collateral account with the central bank. It applies only in the case of a 
pooling system (i.e. one collateral pool per bank to secure all central bank credit operations; 
in an earmarking system, the value of the collateral posted is always very close to the 
outstanding credit). It is remarkable how the under-proportional use of Government bonds is 
relative to their share in the eligible assets. This reflects that in interbank repo markets, 















bn euro)   
% over 
total 
Central Government  259 12.7%
Regional Government  72 3.5%
Covered bank bonds  274 13.4%
Corporate bonds  104 5.1%
Unsecured bank bonds  506 24.8%
ABS 502 24.6%
Other marketable assets  23 1.1%
Non-marketable (loans)  302 14.8%
Total   2,041 100.0%
 
 
It is interesting to compare these with a very simple aggregate euro area MFI balance sheet. It has to 
be assumed that the securities held are largely Eurosystem eligible. Again, the larger part of the 
securities will however not be “highly liquid” as defined by the regulation.  
 
MFI aggregate balance sheet (end Dec. 2009, in trillions of euro; source: ECB monthly report) 
Assets                                       Liabilities 
Loans                                                            17.7  
 
Securities                                                      5.0 
Of which: 
Government                                                   1.5 
Other euro area residents                             1.5 
MFIs                                                              2.0 
Deposits                                                        16.5 
 
Repos                                                             0.3 
 
Debt securities issued                                   4.9 
 
Rest                                                                8.4  Rest                                                                 9.7 
Total assets                                                   31.1  Total assets                                                    31.1 
 
It is difficult for various reasons to draw firm conclusions from the data above on the impact of the 
new liquidity regulation. Still, the following is suggested by the data: 
  For liquidity buffers of banks, central bank eligible assets that are not highly liquid (according 
to the LCR definition) play a key role.   
  The differentiated treatment between “highly liquid” and “only central bank eligible” 
securities will have a huge impact, since the former is only a relatively small subset of the 
latter for the Eurosystem.   
3.5 The central bank support during crisis time 
In the previous section, we explained why banks have to rely on central banks during normal times to 
raise the necessary cash, as the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central bank is 
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designed on the basis of an economic cost-benefit analysis. In this section, we provide a deeper 
normative analysis of why central banks should accept a broader range of collateral than the range 
accepted in interbank operations, and why the central bank should remain forthcoming towards its 
counterparties in a liquidity crisis when all private players take restrictive risk control measures. Some 
more light will thereby also be shed on moral hazard issues.    
Before doing so, it is good to recall the rather clear 19
th century conclusion about the supportive role of 
central banks, which has been seen in two variants. Both are famous, and nevertheless worth being 
recalled in the context of the new liquidity regulation. First, Jeremiah Harman, director of the Bank of 
England, summarized in a hearing of the Lords’ Committee in 1832 the Bank's actions in the panic of 
1825 as (found e.g. in Bagehot 1873): 
  
  We lent… by every possible means, and in modes that we never had adopted before; we took in 
stock of security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances on Exchequer bills, we not 
only discounted outright, but we made advances on deposits of bills to an immense amount; in 
short, by every possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank;… seeing the dreadful 
state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our power.  
 
It is useful to note that the statement is about extra liquidity injection into the financial system at the 
benefit of all banks under circumstances of a collective financial market liquidity crisis, not about 
emergency liquidity assistance to individual banks (as often wrongly assumed). Harman explains the 
Bank of England's action as having been creative and pro-active, i.e. to have innovated to find the best 
ways to support funding liquidity of financial institutions, the only constraint to creativity being the 
need to preserve the “safety of the Bank”.  
The second famous view on central bank supportiveness from the 19
th century central banking 
literature is due to Bagehot (1873) himself, and states the so-called “inertia principle” according to 
which the central bank should maintain its risk control framework at least inert, and accept an increase 
of the risk it takes in a crisis situation: 
  If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is 
reckoned a good security and on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible, the 
alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed. But if securities, really good and 
usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will 
fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse. 
In contrast to Harman, Bagehot does not emphasise the pro-active nature of the measures taken, but 
the fact that the central bank must remain “inert” and not tighten its risk control framework (e.g. by 
restricting the set of eligible collateral for advances), such as other market players would do.  
  18In any case, it has been unquestioned central banker wisdom since the 19
th century that the central 
bank must be supportive in a liquidity crisis. Today, probably as much as in the 19
th century, three 
main reasons can be provided for a broad range of central bank collateral, and continued support 
during a financial crisis. 
 
(1) Negative social externalities of illiquidity (and bankruptcy). The central bank should be ready to 
engage in measures supporting the funding liquidity of banks because of the potential negative 
externalities of bank stress and bank default. As a public player, it should have overall welfare in 
mind, i.e. encompass externalities. This argument has obviously a moral hazard dimension. 
Brunnermeier et al (2009) provide three reasons for financial regulation, of which the following would 
be “by far the most important”:  “where there are sufficient externalities that the social, and overall, 
costs of market failure exceed both the private costs of failure and the extra costs of regulation.” They 
then review five types of externalities, of which they believe the following to be most important as a 
root cause to recent financial crisis: “In order to deal with such liquidity problems prior to failure, and 
in the course of liquidation after failure, the bank in difficulties will often be forced to sell assets (fire 
sales). But such sales will drive down the current market price of the same assets held on other banks’ 
books, when these are valued on a mark-to-market basis. And, of course, the same is true the other 
way around; solvency is not exogenous to liquidity. When there is a generalised liquidity problem 
attempts to deal with it will lead to declines in asset values, creating a solvency problem, even where 
none existed before. In short, there is an internal amplifying process (liquidity spirals) whereby a 
falling asset market leads banks, investment houses, etc., to make more sales (deleveraging), which 
further drives down asset prices and financial intermediaries’ assessed profit and loss and balance 
sheet net worth. We believe that it is this internal, self-amplifying dynamic that has lain at the root of 
both the recent, and virtually all prior, financial crises.” Similarly, Perotti and Suarez (2010, 2) argue 
that “Because of fire sales or counterparty risk externalities, each bank’s funding decision has an 
impact on the vulnerability of other banks, causing a negative externality… Because of the wedge 
between the net private value of short-term funding and its social cost, absent regulation banks will 
rely excessively on short term funding.”    
(2) The central bank is the only economic agent not threatened by illiquidity in its own currency. 
Central banks have been endowed with the monopoly and freedom to issue the legal tender: central 
bank money. Therefore, they are never threatened by illiquidity in their own currency and it seems 
natural (even from a purely commercial perspective) that, in case of a liquidity crisis when all agents 
price liquidity very high, the central bank remains more willing than others to hold (as collateral or 
outright) assets which are less liquid. This argument has nothing to do with negative externalities or 
with moral hazard. Even if the central bank were a commercially oriented enterprise, its exemption 
from liquidity stress should make it ready to take over illiquid positions in a crisis against a premium.  
  19(3) Haircuts are a powerful risk mitigation tool if credit risk is asymmetric and the cash taker 
(i.e. collateral provider) is more credit risky. If, however, both the cash taker and the cash lender are 
both equally credit risky, then the power of haircuts is limited. Indeed, with haircuts, the cash taker is 
exposed to the risk of default of the cash lender, since, in case of such default, he is uncertain to get his 
collateral back. This is why haircuts between banks of similar credit quality tend to be low, while 
banks impose potentially high haircuts when they lend to e.g. hedge funds. This also explains why 
banks would never question haircuts imposed by the central bank, which can not default (see also 
Ewerhart and Tapking, 2008).  
These three specificities together have lead to the conclusion that the central bank should play a 
special role in terms of collateral acceptance and liquidity provision in normal times and financial 
crisis. The three arguments should be counterbalanced against the one that there is no reason to expect 
the central bank to be very good in credit risk management, valuation, and in preventing to be 
sometimes tricked by counterparties who are at the brink of default and eventually default. Therefore, 
being too supportive may mean at the end to have central bank losses, i.e. an uncontrolled leakage of 
public resources to eventually defaulted entities. Or, it may require substantial spending of the central 
bank on collateral and risk management, also to over-compensate its comparative weaknesses in these 
activities. This has again a clear moral hazard dimension. Indeed, one could argue that as long as the 
central bank never makes losses, there is no real moral hazard issue, as funds are eventually not 
diverted to those who took non-prudent decisions.  
The solutions to the two moral hazard issues could be as follows (see also section 6.4): penalise 
excessive reliance on the central bank through surcharges (thereby supporting the regulation), 
maintain a thorough and as needed expensive central bank risk management and collateral valuation 
framework, and charge banks for the costs associated with the collateral they submit. Both measures 
serve to internalise costs, and thereby to prevent moral hazard. The calibration of the fees charged to 
banks for the risk management of the collateral they submit seems relatively straightforward, as these 
should basically reflect costs. The calibration of surcharges for excess reliance is less obvious (see 
section 6.4).  
The two measures would address two points already seen in the 19
th century, namely preservation of 
“the safety of the [central] bank” (Hamann in 1832), and lending to banks under liquidity stress at a 
“high price” (Bagehot in 1872). The latter represents also an extra risk compensation. If these 
conditions are met, the central bank will not have a priori difficulties with the idea that it supports 
bank funding liquidity in normal and crisis times, which will be anticipated by banks and will reflect 
this in their liquidity risk management exactly explaining the necessity for the liquidity risk regulation 
to require banks to internalise the liquidity risks.  
 
 
  204. The impact of bank behaviour on the LCR and DFS 
 
This section and the following one provide examples of key interactions between the new liquidity 
risk regulation and the central bank operational framework. In particularly, this section assesses how 
certain bank behaviour can impact the compliance with the LCR, can affect the LCR and DFS measure 
and have repercussions for central bank operations and central bank risks. More specifically, the 
section shows how interactions between both frameworks provide “arbitraging” opportunities of the 
liquidity risk regulation, which can have  detrimental effects for monetary policy and regulation.  
The analysis consists of some basic illustrative examples that show the impact of bank behaviour on 
the LCR and DFS  measure.   
 
  “Distance to asset fire sales” (DFS): total amount of short term market funding evaporation 
that the bank can handle without fires sales of less liquid assets (as already introduced in 
section 3.3). In the following, we will consider examples of banks which will always have the 
same absolute balance sheet length, and therefore it does not matter to differentiate between 
relative and absolute measures.  
 
To also reflect the impact of a closer alignment of the liquidity risk regulation with the central 
bank operations, the following two measures are used: 
  LCR* = (non-encumbered Government bonds + cash + all non-encumbered central bank 
eligible assets applying central bank collateral haircuts) / (30 days cash outflows).  
  LCR** = (non-encumbered Government bonds + cash + all non-encumbered central bank 
eligible assets applying central bank collateral haircuts) / (30 days cash outflows whereby 
applying a zero roll off for all central bank eligible securities) 
 
LCR* includes in the nominator all non-encumbered central bank eligible assets, although applying as 
haircuts the one applied by the central bank. LCR** moreover assumes a zero roll off rate for all non-
encumbered central bank eligible securities. These measures thus show the effect of a higher 
recognition of the impact the monetary policy operations on the LCR measure; but by definition lower 
the objectives of the regulation in terms of pricing liquidity risk by requiring firms to raise funding in 
markets on their own capacity (or to price their own capacity) and provide a buffer to absorb shocks.  
Additionally, it also reflects the notion underlying the regulation that central banks should not be the 
lender of “first” resort. As a result the liquidity risk regulation does not define the liquid assets as the 
central bank eligible collateral, the regulatory standards therefore can provide different indications 
than the measures that assess the probability of forced sales and systemic liquidity distress.   
 
 
  21 
4.1 A first example 
Consider as example the following three bank balance sheets. 
Bank 1 
Government bonds                                125 
A-rated corporate bonds                          0 
CDOs                                                    125 
Long term market funding                             100 
Short term unsecured market funding            100  
Long term central bank borrowing                  50 
Short term central bank borrowing                    0 
 
Bank 2 
Government bonds                                    0 
A-rated corporate bonds                          250 
CDOs                                                       0 
Long term market funding                             100 
Short term unsecured market funding            100  
Long term central bank borrowing                  50 
Short term central bank borrowing                    0 
 
Bank 3 
Government bonds                                   100 
A-rated corporate bonds                          150 
CDOs                                                       0 
Long term market funding                             100 
Short term unsecured market funding            100  
Long term central bank borrowing                  50 
Short term central bank borrowing                    0 
 
 
Assume that the central bank accepts corporate bonds at a haircut of 10% (down to a BBB- rating, 
such as applied by the ECB). It also accepts Government bonds at a zero haircut, but does not accept 
at all CDOs. Of the assets considered in the example, the liquidity regulation only defines (non-
encumbered) Government bonds as liquid assets. Additionally, as we define the short term unsecured 
market funding to be received from non-financial corporates a 75% run-off factor applies. Finally, 
notice that the above example shows the gross amounts of the balance sheet of the three banks.  The 
following table provides the resulting liquidity measures for the three banks.   
 
  Bank 1  Bank 2  Bank 3 
DFS 75  175  155 
LCR 1.00  0  1.3 
LCR* = LCR**  1.00  2.33  2.5 
 
 
The result is obtained that bank 1 fulfils the LCR (LCR=1) with a DFS of 75, while the second bank 
fails to fulfil the LCR (LCR = 0) but is much better in the DFS (at 175). This results from the fact that 
Bank 2 has an unused central bank borrowing potential of 175, and can therefore survive an outflow of 
its 100 of short term market funding before having to rely on asset fire sales. In contrast, Bank 1 may 
have to engage in asset fire sales of its CDOs when its short term funding outflows reach a certain 
level. The LCR* and LCR** measures are more aligned with the DFS measure in the sense that they 
have high and sufficient values for bank 2 (LCR* and LCR** are obviously identical as the central 
bank funding is all long term in the example chosen). This example illustrates the different 
information provided from the LCR and the DFS measures as indications of resilience to liquidity 
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and provides an indication of the distance of banks from being forced to enter into asset fire sales and 
thereby trigger negative systemic externalities. The LCR measure was deliberately designed to provide 
an indication of the extent that the bank relies on its own capacities to raise funding.   
Bank 3 performs best in terms of both the DFS and the LCR measure. It is interesting to note that this 
is the case although the bank has less highly liquid assets and the same liabilities as bank 1. This 
example illustrates that central bank eligibility of collateral is not at all irrelevant for the LCR in the 
sense that the existence of non-LCR-liquid but central bank eligible assets improves the LCR as it 
makes a higher share of the LCR-liquid assets non-encumbered. This clearly provides an incentive for 
banks to post illiquid assets at the central bank. Another illustration is as follows: if bank 1 would 
substitute its CDOs by corporate bonds (i.e. one type of non highly liquid assets by another), it would 
increase its liquid non-encumbered assets by 50, and its LCR accordingly to 1.67.  
 
4.2 Effects on asset yields and central bank operations when the regulation is introduced 
The following example assesses the changes that banks can make to comply with the regulation, 
consider the example of a system of financial accounts with two banks and one account representing 
the institutional investors’ community in the economy. Assume that Government bonds in the initial 
equilibrium yield 1%, A-rated corporates 2%, CDOs 3%, and that central bank and market funding 
costs are 1%, such that banks are initially just profitable. The two banks are at the starting point, i.e. 
before liquidity regulation, both in competitive equilibrium in terms of profits (i.e. zero profit). Again, 
the central bank is assumed to accept corporate bonds with a haircut of 10% (but not CDOs). Finally it 
is assumed that investors are ready to change their asset composition, but that their marginal valuation 
decreases (increases) for each asset type by one basis point when holdings increase (decrease) by one 
unit of account. 
Investors 
Government bonds                            100 
A-rated corporate bonds                    100 
CDOs                                                 100 
Short term deposits with banks           60 
Long term deposits with banks            60 




Government bonds                            100 
A-rated corporate bonds                        0 
CDOs                                                 100 
Short term market funding                        60  
Long term market funding                        60  
Central bank borrowing  3M                     40 
Central bank borrowing 1W                      40 
 
Bank  2 
Government bonds                                50 
A-rated corporate bonds                      100 
CDOs                                                     50 
Short term market funding                        60  
Long term market funding                         60  
Central bank borrowing  3M                     40 
Central bank borrowing 1W                      40 
 
  23For the initial pre-regulation equilibrium, the value for the liquidity risk measures are displayed in the 
following table in columns 1 and 2. If the LCR is made binding, banks will have to take corrective 
actions to comply with it. Three possibilities are examined in the following examples.   
 
I.  Amend the distribution of longer term central bank funding to the individual banks. 
Bank 1 could take a larger share of the longer term funding from the central bank. If the long 
term funding is offered via a variable rate tender procedure, bank 1 could bid marginally more 
(a few basis points to be sure to get the desired share) and get the entire long term funding.
6 
The results in the columns 3 and 4 of the following table show that there is only a negative 
impact on bank 2, and no positive one on bank 1. While this is a result from the specific 
example which should not be generalised (it reflects the fact that bank 1 was using highly 
liquid assets as collateral with the central bank, implying a zero run-off rate), this amendment 
would normally only have a limited impact in view of the low run-off rate assumed for short 
term central bank funding backed by LCR illiquid assets.  
II.  Banks can buy government bonds from the other investors, and sell non-liquid assets. If 
each bank takes 50 and in exchange sells 50 of its CDOs, both banks reach comfortable values 
of the LCR. However, banks turn out to be non-profitable in the example proposed, which is 
also not a desirable outcome. In practice, this of course depends on the interest elasticities of 
the other investors’ demand for the various assets types. The higher the interest rate 
elasticities, the better this solution works.   
III.  Banks can lengthen the duration of their market refinancing from investors. Assume all 
of their market funding would become 3 months funding (and we also assume, somewhat 
artificially, that all funding would have a residual maturity of more than 1 month). Again, this 
easily achieves a sufficient LCR, but, under the assumptions taken in terms of interest rate 
elasticity of investors supply of funds at different maturities, again makes banks non-
profitable.    
 
The following table summarises the balance sheet positions of banks (first grey-shaded area of the 
table), the various bank liquidity measures and their components (subsequent non-shaded area; 
calculated on the basis of the raw bank balance sheet data, and the parameters set by regulators and 
central bankers), the investors’ asset positions (second grey-shaded area) and finally the asset and 
liability remuneration rates and income associated with the various bank balance sheet positions. In 
the stylized example provided, the balance sheet changes made by the banks to comply with the 
liquidity risk regulation will be costly. These changes will potentially affect the yield curve and 
                                                 
6 Note that in this paper, we always assume that “long term funding” such as three months funding has a residual maturity or 
more than one month, which is of course a simplification (assuming regular and granular overlapping refinancing operations, 
typically around one third of three months operations would have a residual maturity of less than one month). 
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exchange or interaction with the other market participants / investors and with the central bank. 
Further work has to consider a more realistic interaction with the other market players. The effect of 
the central bank operations is shown in the next section.  
    Initial scenario             Scenario I             Scenario II              Scenario III
1 2345678
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2
Bank assets
Government bonds, CB debt certificates 100 50 100 50 150 100 100 50
corporate bonds 100 100 100 100
CDOs 100 50 100 50 50 0 100 50
Bank liabilities
1 W market funding 60 60 60 60 60 60 00
3 M market funding 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 120
1 W CB funding 40 40 0 80 40 40 40 40
3 M CB funding 40 40 80 04 04 04 0
Liquidity measures
Highly Liquid assets 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 150.0 100.0 100.0 50.0
Total CB borrowing 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
Total CB borrowing potential 100.0 140.0 100.0 140.0 150.0 190.0 100.0 140.0
Total CB borrowing potential HL assets 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 150.0 100.0 100.0 50.0
Total CB borrowing potential non-HL assets 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0
Total CB borrowing collater with non-HL assets 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0
Total CB borrowing collater with HL assets 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with non-HL assets 0.0 40.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 40.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with HL assets 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 0.0
Non-encumbered highly liquid assets 20.0 50.0 20.0 50.0 70.0 100.0 20.0 50.0
Run off in one month 45.0 55.0 45.0 65.0 45.0 55.0 0.0 10.0
LCR 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.8 1.6 1.8 - 5.0
LCR * 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.0 - 6.0
LCR ** 0.4 1.3 0.4 1.3 1.6 2.4 - -
DFS 20.0 60.0 20.0 60.0 70.0 110.0 20.0 60.0
Investors' assets
Gvt bonds 100 100 0 100
Corporate bonds 100 100 100 100
CDOs 100 100 200 100
1W lending to banks 60 60 60 0
3M lending to banks 60 60 60 120
Asset yields
Government bonds, CB debt certificates 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1%
C a s h  ( d e p o s i t s  w i t h  C B ) 1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1
corporate bonds 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
C D O s 3 %3 %3 %3 %4 %4 %3 %3
1W Interbank lending 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
1 W market funding 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
3 M market funding 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3.6% 3.6%
1 W CB funding 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
3  M  C B  f u n d i n g 1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1
1W Interbank borrowing 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Bank Income (yield * bank asset)
Government bonds, CB debt certificates 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5
Cash (deposits with CB) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
corporate bonds 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0
CDOs 3.0 1.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 0.0 3.0 1.5
1W Interbank lending 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bank funding cost (yield * liability)
1 W market funding -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 0.0 0.0
3 M market funding -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -4.3 -4.3
1 W CB funding -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
3 M CB funding -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
1W Interbank borrowing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0







4.3 Two–sided central bank recourse, “adverse selection” and crowding-out 
The following example considers a bank funding central bank deposits through central bank 
borrowing backed by LCR illiquid assets.  
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Government bonds                                 100 
A-rated corporate bonds                         200 
Deposits with central bank                       π 
Long term market funding                         20 
Short term market funding                         200 
Central bank borrowing  3M                      80 + π 
 
In the initial condition the bank has an LCR of 0.7.  Interestingly, though, it can increase its LCR by 
demanding extra cash from the central bank (in this example through 3-month central bank repo 
transaction) and holding it as deposit with the central bank. The table below shows this effect as the 
parameter  π (proportion of additional central bank funding and central bank deposit) in the bank 





Government bonds, CB debt certificates 100 100 100 100 100 100
Cash (deposits with CB) = π 20 40 60 80 100
corporate bonds 200 200 200 200 200 200
Bank liabilities
1 W market funding 200 200 200 200 200 200
3  M  m a r k e t  f u n d i n g 2 02 02 02 02 02
3 M CB funding 80 100 120 140 160 180
Liquidity measures
Highly Liquid assets 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0 180.0 200.0
Total CB borrowing 80.0 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0 180.0
Total CB borrowing potential 280.0 280.0 280.0 280.0 280.0 280.0
Total CB borrowing potential HL assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total CB borrowing potential non-HL assets 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0
Total CB borrowing collater with non-HL assets 80.0 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0 180.0
Total CB borrowing collater with HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with non-HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-encumbered highly liquid assets 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0 180.0 200.0
Run off in one month 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0
LCR 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
LCR * 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7
LCR ** 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7




The bank can increase its LCR linearly by 0.1 with each 20 of extra central bank funding it takes for 
depositing with the central bank. The attractiveness of doing so of course depends on how desperate 
the bank is in its search for ways to comply with the LCR, and what costs arise with this technique, as 
central banks normally apply an interest rate spread between lending operations and deposit collection. 
For instance the Eurosystem currently applies a spread of 75 basis points, while other central banks 
foresee a more narrow spread of e.g. 25 basis points. However, for banks in desperate need to reduce 
any liquidity shortfall, these spreads will not be prohibitive. The incentive to perform these kind of 
                                                 
7 The table is in structure in principle like the previous example, although the investors’ assets and the remuneration rates of 
assets and liabilities are no longer of interest (as they do not change).  
 
  26operations will also depend on the actual implementation of the liquidity risk regulation (e.g. the 
number of times that supervisors monitor the ratios). 
 
In any case, it should be noted that the spread might not necessarily be detrimental to banks to perform 
these kinds of operations, as an increase of borrowing by an LCR constrained bank can also be 
achieved through a refinancing substitution channel. Consider the case of the following two banks.  
 
Bank 1 
Government bonds                                 100 
A-rated corporate bonds                         200 
Long term market funding                         20 
Short term market funding                         200 
Central bank borrowing  3M                      80  
    
Bank 2 
Government bonds                                 100 
A-rated corporate bonds                         200 
Long term market funding                         170 
Short term market funding                         50 
Central bank borrowing  3M                      80 
 
Bank 1 is identical to the initial bank in the previous example, and thus, again, does achieve an LCR of 
only 0.7 (see column 1 of the following table). Bank 2 is an exemplary bank with a high share of long 
term funding which already initially fulfils the LCR with a value of 2.7 (see column 2 of the following 
table). Bank 1 can actually achieve compliance with the LCR by crowding out bank 2 from central 
bank refinancing. This works at low cost for bank 1 if bank 2 has no problems to refinance in the 
market at short term, i.e. if it has an excellent credit rating and therefore is not constrained in its 
market funding. Then, bank 1 can bid somewhat more aggressively in the (assumed) variable rate 
tenders for 3 months funds, and bank 2 will conclude that competing for central bank funding is not 
attractive under these circumstances, and will instead go to the market. In the example chosen (see 
columns 3 and 4 in the table below), bank 1 crowds out bank 2 completely, and both banks will 
eventually achieve a compliant LCR. The central bank will however have seen the weighted average 
credit quality of its counterparties decrease, and its concentration risk increase. Also, the true liquidity 
situation of the banks has not really improved. Hence, to comply with the regulation weaker banks (in 
terms of capital and liquidity positions) will be incited to rely even more heavily on the central bank 
funding
8, thereby using illiquid collateral (see also Eisenschmidt and Holthausen, 2011 and van den 
End, 2010). This will affect the overall risk taking of the central bank.  
 
                                                 
8 This effect is of course already present outside the introduction of the liquidity regulation. 
  27Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2
1234
Bank assets
Government bonds, CB debt certificates 100 100 100 100
Cash (deposits with CB) = π
corporate bonds 200 200 200 200
Bank liabilities
1 W market funding 200 50 120 130
3 M market funding 20 170 20 170
3 M CB funding 80 80 160 0
Liquidity measures
Highly Liquid assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total CB borrowing 80.0 80.0 160.0 0.0
Total CB borrowing potential 280.0 280.0 280.0 280.0
Total CB borrowing potential HL assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total CB borrowing potential non-HL assets 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0
Total CB borrowing collater with non-HL assets 80.0 80.0 160.0 0.0
Total CB borrowing collater with HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with non-HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-encumbered highly liquid assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Run off in one month 150.0 37.5 90.0 97.5
LCR 0.7 2.7 1.1 1.0
LCR * 1.3 5.3 1.3 2.9
LCR ** 1.3 5.3 1.3 2.9
DFS 200.0 200.0 120.0 280.0  
5. Central bank operations and banks’ compliance with the 
liquidity risk regulation 
The previous section showed that certain central bank operations can provide “arbitraging” 
opportunities of the liquidity risk regulation. This section reviews how central bank policies influence 
the ability of banks to comply with the new liquidity risk regulation. The last subsection puts the 
findings in an international context and shortly discusses the challenges of obtaining an international 
level playing field regarding the implementation of the liquidity risk regulation.  
 
5.1 Collateral eligibility 
This first example illustrates the importance of collateral eligibility, which was already touched upon 
in the previous section. 
 
Bank 1 
Government bonds                                       100  
A-rated corporate bonds                                  0 
CDOs                                                           100 
1W market funding                                          60  
3M market funding                                          60 
Central bank borrowing  3M                            80  
 
Bank  2 
Government bonds                                        50  
A-rated corporate bonds                             100  
CDOs                                                            50  
1W market funding                                         60  
3M market funding                                          60         
Central bank borrowing  3M                           80  
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Collateral eligibility has no representation in the banks’ balance sheets, as it concerns the status given 
to certain asset side balance sheet positions of banks. In our simple examples, the central bank may 
specifically consider whether or not to accept corporate bonds and CDOs as collateral, and at what 
haircut.  
The table below summarises the results for different eligibility decisions and values of haircuts chosen 
by the central banks. Of course, the value of haircuts does not appear itself as a pure policy measure. It 
should be derived to ensure sufficient risk protection of the central bank, namely such that the 
expected loss from a certain quantity of CDOs used as collateral is similar to the expected loss to the 
central bank from the use by banks of other types of central bank collateral (see section 3). The 
following policy scenarios are distinguished: 
I.  Narrow collateral set: only accept Government bonds as collateral.  
II.  Intermediate collateral set: accept Government bonds and A-rated corporate bonds at a 
haircut of 10%.  
III.  Broad collateral set: accept Government bonds, A-rated corporate bonds at a haircut of 
10%, and CDOs at a haircut of 25%. 
The table below presents the results for the two banks in terms of DFS and LCR measures. Under the 
intermediate approach (II), which is the one that had been assumed in previous examples, bank 1 is 
non-compliant with the LCR, but bank 2 is compliant, thanks to the indirect effects of corporate bonds 
being used for central bank refinancing, which makes that all Government bonds are non-encumbered. 
Under the narrow approach (I), bank 1 is unchanged in terms of LCR, but bank 2 is constrained and 
even needs to reduce its central bank funding (and increase short term market funding) as it no longer 
has sufficient collateral. Its LCR is zero, and so is its DFS. Under the broad collateral set, both banks 
have a compliant LCR, thanks to the effect that all Government bonds remain non-encumbered as 
other assets can collateralise central bank borrowing.   
 
 collateral  set 
  I.  narrow   II. medium  III broad 
Bank 1 
LCR   0.4 0.4  2.1 
DFS   20  20  95 
LCR*   0.4  0.4  2.1 
LCR**   0.4  0.4  2.1 
Bank 2 
LCR   0* 1.1  1.1 
DFS   0*  60  97.5 
LCR*   0*  1.3  2.2 
LCR**   0*  1.3  2.2 
    * after substituting central bank funding which can no longer be 
collateralised with short term market funding  
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from irrelevant under the new liquidity regulation. However, its impact is not that obvious, as it 
depends on the way in which the amount of non-encumbered highly liquid assets is affected. 
Therefore, defining an international fixed set of liquid assets underlying the LCR measure in a context 
of different central bank policies clearly does not provide a level playing field across jurisdictions.   
 
5.2 Change maturity of central bank refinancing operations 
The LCR regulation makes a distinction between short term (30-days and less) and longer term central 
bank funding, and more specifically short term central bank funding collateralised with non-highly 
liquid assets receives a run-off rate of 25% (short term funding collateralised with highly liquid assets, 
receives a run-off factor of zero). Therefore, the maturity of funding provided by the central bank is 
relevant (as long term central bank funding will have a zero run-off, if not maturing within a one 
month horizon). Call λ the share of short term operations, and thus (1- λ) the share of long term 
operations offered by a central bank, and assume the following representative bank.   
 
Bank 
Government bonds                                       100 
A-rated corporate bonds                               100 
Short term market funding                               100 
Central bank borrowing  3M                    100.(1- λ) 
Central bank borrowing 1W                          100. λ 
 
  Share of long-term central bank 
operations 
 I.    λ=1  II.   λ=0.5  III.   λ=0 
Bank 1       
LCR   0.9 1.1  1.2 
DFS   90  90  90 
LCR*   0.9  1.1  1.2 
LCR**   1.2  1.2  1.2 
 
Again, the example clearly shows the influence of the central bank decisions on the fulfilment of the 
LCR by the banks. In this case, increasing the share of long term reverse operations facilitates the 
compliance of banks of the LCR standard.  
 
5.3 Outright purchases of securities from banks 
The next example considers the impact of outright purchases of securities by the central bank. For this, 
the central bank’s balance sheet is introduced, which has the following initial form, with a=b=c=0 
indicating that the central bank has initially no outright holdings of securities. 
Central bank 
Central bank 3M- lending              200-a-b-c 
Government bonds                                       a 
A-rated corporate bonds                               b 
CDOs                                                            c 
Banknotes in circulation              200  
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assumed to adjust to some extent through transactions with end investors. For three reasons, the 
equilibrium after the purchases will not be the same as the one before the start of the purchases: first, 
relative asset prices and yields change; second, the liquidity deficit of the banks vis-à-vis the central 
bank diminishes; third, compliance with the liquidity regulation will change, which may trigger 
corrective action. Assuming that the central bank purchases proportionally from the two banks 
according to their initial positions in the respective security, the following changes occur to the 
assumed banks’ balance sheets. 
 
Bank 1 
Government bonds                            100 - 2/3 a 
A-rated corporate bonds                                   0 
CDOs                                                 100 – 2/3 c 
Short term market funding                              100  
Central bank borrowing  3M            100 – 2(a+c)/3 
 
 
Bank  2 
Government bonds                               50 –1/3 a 
A-rated corporate bonds                      100 - b 
CDOs                                                   50 –1/3 c 
Short term market funding                             100  
Central bank borrowing  3M        100 – ( a+2b+c)/3 
 
 
Now we can calculate how the LCRs of the two banks evolve as a function of a, b, and c. We consider 
the following five scenarios:  
I.  The central bank purchases 100 Government bonds. 
II.  The central bank purchases 100 corporate bonds. 
III.  The central bank purchases 100 of CDOs. It may be noted that the purchasing of CDOs is 
in principle equivalent to the central bank purchasing foreign reserves from domestic 
banks.  
IV.  The central bank purchase 100 of corporate bonds and 100 of CDOs. In this case, short 
term market funding must migrate from bank 2 to bank 1, as otherwise bank 1 would be in 
a liquidity surplus. The balance sheets of the system will take the following form:  
Central bank 
Central bank 3M- lending                            0 
Government bonds                                       0 
A-rated corporate bonds                           100 
CDOs                                                        100 




Government bonds                                       100  
A-rated corporate bonds                                   0 
CDOs                                                           33.3 
Short term market funding                          133.3  
Central bank borrowing  3M                              0 
 
 
Bank  2 
Government bonds                                        50 
A-rated corporate bonds                                 0 
CDOs                                                         16.6 
Short term market funding                             66.6  
Central bank borrowing  3M                             0 
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the banking system ends in a liquidity surplus, therefore it is assumed that the central bank 
issues debt certificates to extract the excess liquidity. Central bank debt certificates are 
eligible collateral for central bank borrowing (including in the marginal lending facility), 
and the same haircuts apply as for Government bonds (namely zero in the present 
example). Central bank debt certificates are also recognised by the new liquidity 
regulation as highly liquid assets. The following system of accounts assumes that the debt 
certificates are purchased equally by the two banks.  
 
Central bank 
Central bank 3M- lending                            0 
Government bonds                                    100 
A-rated corporate bonds                           100 
CDOs                                                        100 
Banknotes in circulation              200  
Debt certificates issued                          100 
 
Bank 1 
Government bonds                                       33.3 
A-rated corporate bonds                                   0 
CDOs                                                           33.3 
Debt certificates                                           50 
Short term market funding                          116.6  
Central bank borrowing  3M                              0 
 
 
Bank  2 
Government bonds                                    16.6 
A-rated corporate bonds                                 0 
CDOs                                                         16.6 
Debt certificates                                           50 
Short term market funding                             83.3  
Central bank borrowing  3M                             0 
 
 
The following table summarises the LCR and DFS outcomes of various outright holdings of the 
central bank in the three types of financial assets.
9  
 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that the 1 month cash outflow in all of these examples is 0.75 * 120 = 90. Therefore LCR* = LCR ** = 
DFS / 90. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
base case     I. a=100    II. b=100       III. c=100     IV. b=c=100    V. a=b=c=100
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2
Bank assets
Government bonds, CB debt certificates 100 50 33.3 16.6 100 50 100 50 100 50 83.3 66.6
corporate bonds 100 0 100 0 100 0 0
CDOs 100 50 100 50 100 50 33.3 16.6 33.3 16.6 33.3 16.6
Bank liabilities
1 W market funding 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 133.3 66.6 116.6 83.3
3 M market funding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 W CB funding 0 0 0 0 00000
3 M CB funding 100 100 33.
0
3 66.6 100 0 33.3 66.6 0 0 0 0
Liquidity Measures
Highly Liquid assets 100.0 50.0 33.3 16.6 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 83.3 66.6
Total CB borrowing 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.6 100.0 0.0 33.3 66.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB borrowing potential 100.0 140.0 33.3 106.6 100.0 50.0 100.0 140.0 100.0 50.0 83.3 66.6
Total CB borrowing potential HL assets 100.0 50.0 33.3 16.6 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 83.3 66.6
Total CB borrowing potential non-HL assets 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB borrowing collater with non-HL assets 0.0 90.0 0.0 66.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB borrowing collater with HL assets 100.0 10.0 33.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with non-HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total CB 1W borr collater with HL assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-encumbered highly liquid assets 0.0 40.0 0.0 16.6 0.0 50.0 66.7 50.0 100.0 50.0 83.3 66.6
Run off in one month 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 100.0 50.0 87.5 62.5
LCR 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
LCR * 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
LCR ** 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
DFS 0.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 50.0 66.7 73.4 100.0 50.0 83.3 66.6 
 
The example shows that outright operations by central banks of the regulatory illiquid assets can have 
a strong influence on the fulfilment of the liquidity coverage ratio, although the impact depends on the 
initial positions of banks in the relevant assets. In the central bank purchase case I (a=100), bank 2 is 
even made worse off in terms of LCR (compare column 2 and 4). There is however a small 
improvement of bank 2’s LCR in scenario V compared to scenario IV (the two scenarios differ, again, 
by an extra purchase of 100 of Government bonds by the central bank).       
It is important to retain that outright asset purchases tend to be supportive in terms of bank liquidity 
buffers if they focus on the less liquid assets, i.e. those not even accepted by the central bank, but that 
effects are overall heterogeneous across banks.  
Outright purchases as a central bank tool would be influenced by the extent that banks rely on liquid 
assets to absorb shocks. As shown by van den End (2010), since banks with a relatively high share of 
liquid assets depend more on developments in the markets. This would imply that “central banks 
increasingly may have to resort to asset purchases in stead of refinancing operations to influence 
banks’ liquidity position”. 
 
5.4 The international liquidity level playing field  
The examples above show that an internationally harmonised liquidity risk regulation with differing 
central bank operational and collateral frameworks does not allow for a level playing field for banks. 
While on the one hand, compared to the patchwork of regulation and supervision that consisted before 
the introduction of the regulation, the supervision of course will become more harmonised, on the 
  33other hand  a full-fledged level playing field will not be obtained if one does not control for the central 
bank operations.  
 
Eventually, a level playing field would only be achievable if the entire external environmental to the 
banks would be identical, which of course has never been achieved and will never be achieved. One 
could of course desire that central banks contribute more to a level playing field by converging in 
terms of operational frameworks. However, this would need to take into account that already now 
central bank operational frameworks reflect at least partially differences in the financial and economic 
environment (see e.g. Tabakis and Weller 2009 or Chailloux et al 2008 for comparisons of collateral 
frameworks, including the question of whether or not differences can be explained as reflecting 
different environments in an optimal way, or simply history and random choices). The figure below 
illustrates the issue. Only when the “sum” of the environment and the operational framework are 
identical with regard to their impact on banks, then also a prescriptive global liquidity risk standard 
would obviously be in line with maintaining a level playing field. If the environment is heterogeneous 
across countries, then it is no longer obvious to what extent and how a level playing field can and 














Potential negative externalities 
 
 
One may also ask in this context what measure may be desirable for central banks to take to increase 
the resilience of banks to liquidity shocks. A general answer to this question probably cannot be given. 
The following dimensions may give orientation:  
-  Does the central bank’s changes of its operational framework support true resilience against 
liquidity shocks, i.e. does it truly contribute to enhancing the shock absorbance and reducing 
  34negative externalities of banks’ liquidity stress in a financial crisis, or does it only contribute 
to the formal fulfilment of the liquidity standards? 
-  Does it seem to be fair in terms of a level playing field and does it support convergence of 
operational frameworks, or does it appear as creating a privileged situation for domestic 
banks?  
-  Does it have drawbacks in terms of other objectives of the operational framework? Assuming 
that the operational framework was optimal before the introduction of new liquidity standards, 
to what extent could changes which are inspired by the introduction of the LCR lead to a loss 
of achievement of the other objectives of the central bank operational framework, such as an 
effective monetary policy implementation, efficiency, transparency and simplicity, limitation 
of central bank risk taking, etc.?    
 
General conclusions cannot be drawn without a more thorough analysis of each specific issue 
envisaged.  
 
6. Addressing the interactions between the liquidity risk 
regulation and the CB operational framework 
 
6.1 Interactions between the liquidity risk regulation and CB operational framework 
The examples provided in previous sections show that the liquidity risk regulation and the central bank 
operational framework strongly interact. These interactions are not necessarily positive from a 
monetary policy and financial stability perspective. The “arbitrage” opportunities of the liquidity risk 
regulation through central bank operations can have a number of detrimental effects: 
  They may undermine the effectiveness of the liquidity risk regulation and imply that the 
regulation’s purpose of internalizing liquidity risks and building adequate liquidity buffers that 
must enable the firm to raise on their own capacities the necessary funding in the financial markets 
during stress is not achieved.  
To comply with the regulation, weaker banks (in terms of capital and liquidity positions) will be 
incited to rely even more heavily on the central bank funding, using illiquid collateral
10. This increases 
average counterparty risk, concentration risk, and overall financial risk taking of the central 
bank.Monetary policy implementation may possibly be affected through various other effects, such as 
more aggressive and volatile bidding behavior in open market operations, recourses to central bank 
standing facility not relating to aggregate liquidity conditions, structural changes to the yield curve and 
                                                 
10 The effect of a higher reliance on central bank funding by weaker banks is an effect already present without the liquidity 
risk regulation. 
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etc. (these aspects are not analyzed further in the present paper)    
 
Central bank operations clearly will affect the extent in which banks will be able to comply with the 
regulation. Policies will have to be developed with regard to how central banks should take into 
account this fact when deciding on changes to their operational framework and the use of their 
instrument. The effectiveness of the regulation should not be undermined through monetary policy 
implementation. This, together with the unequal international level playing field in terms of central 
bank operational frameworks and their impact on the ability to comply with the LCR, emphasizes the 
necessity of further analysis and policy development. In particular, further study should consider the 
development of a framework that, in obtaining a specific monetary policy during normal times, 
determines the optimal central bank operational framework but remains in some sense “neutral” (not 
supportive and not detrimental) to banks for their compliance with the liquidity risk regulation.  
 
6.2 Their distinctive purposes 
In view of the important interactions between the liquidity risk regulation and the central bank 
operational framework, the two cannot be treated in isolation. Implementing the regulation as shown 
can have important effects on the central bank operations and, vice versa, the central bank operational 
framework (and modifications) will have important effects on the extent that banks can comply with 
the regulatory requirements.  
 
These interactions though do not argue for a complete alignment of the regulatory and central bank 
operational framework. An example of such an alignment would, for instance, be the acceptance of all 
central bank eligible assets (at equivalent haircuts) as highly liquid assets with a full roll-over of the 
central bank refinancing. These kinds of alignments have been voiced as solutions to the interactions 
between both frameworks. However, such kinds of approaches would undermine the purpose of the 
regulation (i.e. liquidity risk pricing and the building of market based liquidity buffers). Therefore, the 
regulatory and central bank framework have to remain separate to recognize their respective purposes 
and not to lose the effectiveness of their functions.  
 
To appropriately address any negative interactions between both frameworks it will be of utmost 
importance that supervisory authorities and central banks closely cooperate. The cooperation will have 
to consist of, first, a careful identification of any potential negative interactions. The paper provides 
some examples of interactions; however, there probably are many others to consider (also provided the 
changing market and economic conditions). A second element of the cooperation will have to consist 
of taking appropriate actions (both in terms of central bank operations and regulation/supervision) to 
deal with the negative interactions. 
  36The assessment of the interactions and the decision on the appropriate actions will be complicated by 
the potential non-linear affects of the interactions and the different impact of the interactions on the 
individual banks.   
  
6.3 Possible changes of the central bank monetary policy implementation framework? 
 
6.3.1 Central banks could tighten collateral eligibility  
Central banks accepting a wide collateral set, such as the Eurosystem, could reduce the acceptance of 
non-liquid assets (such as idiosyncratic ABS structures and credit claims), and the “self-use” of 
collateral, i.e. the use as collateral of self-originated ABS and self-issued covered and structured 
covered bonds. The latter change, i.e. accepting only securities issued by non-related entities would 
ensure a higher degree of liquidity of central bank eligible assets, as obviously these assets would have 
a minimum degree of tradability and would always have been traded at least once (as they are owned 
by a bank who has not issued or originated them). This would already reduce the “arbitraging 
possibility” that banks would experience under the wide collateral framework and would raise the 
internalization of the liquidity risks.  
 
6.3.2 Central banks could differentiate between liquid and non- liquid assets in their operations  
The Fed has traditionally allowed a much wider collateral set for discount window operations than for 
its reverse open market operations (see Tabakis and Weller, 2009). The Bank of England has 
introduced in 2010 two distinct sets of collateral, one liquid, one less liquid, and conducted longer 
term operations for both sets in parallel, resulting in a higher interest rate for the less liquid collateral 
set (see Bank of England, 2010). In general, the creation of separated collateral pools allows the 
central bank to apply various forms of discrimination against the less liquid collateral set, also in a 
way to limit the arbitraging of the differences between central bank operations and the new liquidity 
regulation. If this is one of the purposes of differentiated collateral sets, then of course, ideally, the sets 
could be more closely aligned with the sets established by regulators (level 1, level 2, non-liquid).  
 
6.3.3 Central banks could strengthen financial disincentives against over-reliance on the central 
bank  
To support the objectives of the regulation, central banks could tackle any excessive reliance of banks 
on the central bank through price disincentives. For instance the IMF has been using for a long time 
surcharges depending on proportionality of the loans relative to the country quotas for its various 
facilities (See e.g. IMF 2008).   
This approach  would help regulators in addressing the issue of over reliance of individual banks on 
central banks and would be in line with Bagehot’s advice to “lend freely, but at a high price” in a 
crisis. An additional approach through which the central bank could address over reliance via its 
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of less liquid assets that are submitted to the central bank as collateral. While it can be justified that 
central banks accept less liquid assets as collateral than the assets accepted in interbank repos (see 
section 3), it will lead to distortions if the central bank would not perform a thorough risk and 
valuation analysis of these assets, or if it does so, but does not charge the banks submitting the 
collateral for that analysis. Therefore, as a second even more obvious element of price incentives 
against undue reliance on the central bank, the central bank could charge the banks the costs associated 
with the acceptance of less liquid (and hence normally more complex) assets.  
 
6.4 The regulation could accept a wider set of liquid assets but with a general extra haircut  
The regulation could in principle
11 consider a wider set of liquid assets and apply general extra 
haircuts (above the central bank haircuts) to all such assets except for government paper of high credit 
quality and liquidity. The size of the extra haircut could be an expression of the regulator’s assessment 
of the potential liquidity value of the assets on the financial markets during the considered regulatory 
stress.  
It should be noted that central banks have rarely restrained collateral eligibility during the recent 
financial crisis.
12 This does not mean that they did not adjust downwards collateral values in line with 
some mark-to-market (or mark-to model) valuation. Therefore, extra haircuts could in addition capture 
the effects of a stress on the availability of central bank funding. Empirical analysis of the asset value 
behavior during recent crises could provide required insights in determining the appropriate haircuts. 
A wider set of liquid assets with more granular haircuts would also reduce the cliff effects that are 
currently present in the regulation (through the current binary categorization between liquid and 
illiquid assets), this would benefit the resilience of the financial system. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper shows the importance of interactions between the new liquidity risk regulatory framework 
and monetary policy operational framework of central banks. It describes how central banks play a 
crucial role in the liquidity provision to banks in normal times and in a financial crisis. The paper 
further provides the reasoning behind the liquidity risk regulation and its objectives. It is noted that the 
liquidity risk regulation, to achieve its purpose and being an international rule, cannot be fully aligned 
with the operational frameworks of individual central banks. The paper provides some clear examples 
of interactions between the two frameworks that affect the extent that banks comply with the 
regulation and effect the central bank operational framework. These interactions though do not argue 
                                                 
11 We refer to section 6.4, the Basel III liquidity risk rules are set at an international level, however, the central bank 
collateral framework (e.g. collateral eligibility) are a reflection of the particular economic and banking landscapes.  
12 During the financial crisis that started in 2007, in fact almost all central banks widened their collateral set. 
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regulation and the central bank operational framework have to be treated distinctively to recognize 
their respective purposes and not to lose the effectiveness of their functions. However, to appropriately 
address any negative interactions between both frameworks, close cooperation between supervisory 
authorities and central banks will be of utmost importance.  Cooperation will have to consist of, first, a 
careful identification of any potential negative interactions and, second, taking appropriate actions to 
deal with the negative interactions. Some general and preliminary examples of measures are provided 
that could (partly) address some of the illustrated negative interactions. The paper also advances the 
use of a second measure, namely the distance to fire sales, to assess the resilience of banks to liquidity 
shocks and to assess the probability of negative externalities through fire sales. 
Underlying the new regulation is the assumption that the firm in first instance should rely on its own 
capacity to raise funding in the financial markets and not to rely on central bank funding. Through this 
assumption the regulation seeks to require banks to internalize or price their liquidity risk. However 
this assumption necessitates a clear qualification as the concept of the liquidity deficit of the banking 
system vis-à-vis the central bank is of relevance, since it explains the banks’ funding dependence on 
the central bank at the aggregate, macro-economic level. This structural dependence of banks on the 
central bank is exogenous to the decisions of banks. The latter has partially a moral hazard 
dimension
13, but also reflects “technological” specificities of the central bank (not being subject to 
liquidity risk in its own currency, and being able to apply the haircut instrument effectively). In 
addition, central banks have a clear economic rational to play the exceptional role of liquidity provider 
during a liquidity crisis.  
To show the interaction between the new liquidity risk regulation and monetary policy, an additional 
measure of liquidity stress is introduced; the distance to fire sales (DFS). The DFS gives an indication 
of the total amount of short term market funding evaporation that the bank can handle without having 
to rely on fire sales of less liquid assets. Starting from various stylized bank balance sheet examples, 
the ability of banks to comply with the LCR and the alternative measures of liquidity is analyzed, and 
examples are given in which the LCR and DFS provide clearly different insights. The examples show 
the necessity to use both measures to assess the resilience of the banks and wider banking sector. 
Provided their different objectives, the LCR measure is of more relevance as liquidity measure during 
normal market conditions; to require banks to price their liquidity risks. However, it loses its relevance 
the stronger the liquidity stress as during these periods the liquidity buffer should help in absorbing the 
liquidity shock. In addition, during these stressed conditions the DFS becomes more relevant as one 
wants to know the extent that a bank is from having to rely on fire sales to cover short-term funding 
market outflows.  
                                                 
13 Namely that the central bank has public welfare in mind, and therefore will not punish those who were reckless in terms of 
liquidity risk management at the expense of the community, but may support them when needed for the sake of avoiding 
negative externalities of illiquidity. However, this shows the necessity of a liquidity risk regulation. 
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The stylized examples show some of the clear interactions between the liquidity risk regulation and 
the central bank operational framework. These interactions, however, can be negative from a monetary 
policy and financial stability perspective. The examples considered show that the interactions can 
provide “arbitraging” opportunities through the central bank operations of the liquidity risk regulation. 
This can have detrimental effects as it would undermine the effectiveness of the regulation. It could 
affect the financial risk taking of the central bank and could affect the monetary policy 
implementation. In addition, central bank operations will clearly affect the extent that banks will be 
able to comply with the regulation. Policies will have to be developed with regard to how central 
banks should take into account this fact when deciding on changes to their operational framework and 
the use of their instrument. The effectiveness of the regulation should not be undermined through 
monetary policy implementation. Therefore, a framework has to be developed that, to obtain a specific 
monetary policy during normal times, determines the most optimal central bank operations but remain 
“neutral” (not supportive and not detrimental) to banks for their compliance with the liquidity risk 
regulation. 
These interactions do not argue for a complete alignment of the regulatory and central bank 
operational framework, since the purpose of the regulation (i.e. liquidity risk pricing and the building 
of liquidity buffers not relating to the central bank) would be completely lost. Therefore, the respective 
frameworks of the regulation and the central bank have to remain separate as to recognize their 
respective purposes and not to lose the effectiveness of their functions. 
The paper provides a few proposals to address some of the negative interactions:   
First, central banks could support the regulatory efforts to reduce reliance of banks on the central 
banks and ensure that banks price the liquidity risks of their activities  thereby revisiting their 
collateral framework. Central banks with a wide collateral set may consider whether this should not 
imply a gradual narrowing of the collateral set, or of certain self-use practices. Second, central banks 
could study if they cannot introduce appropriate price disincentives against excessive reliance of banks 
on them, such as a stepwise increasing surcharge for disproportionate borrowing. This could support 
regulators, would take up Bagehot’s advices, and would also support central bank exposures to remain 
granular and diversified, i.e. would be in the interest of central bank risk management. Third, central 
banks must ensure that the less liquid, and hence normally more complex assets they accept, are 
thoroughly valued and assessed, such as to identify all associated risks. The costs associated with this 
task should be charged to the banks submitting the collateral. Otherwise, an excessive reliance of 
banks on central bank funding with the least liquid collateral will be the result (a sort of Gresham’s 
law for collateral), which may indeed be associated with the term moral hazard.   
However, further work has to elaborate on the potential appropriate proposals. In general, a close 
cooperation will be required between supervisory authorities and central banks to address negative 
  40interactions between the central bank operational frameworks and the regulation. We would therefore 
only partially agree with Jesper Berg (2010) who argues, “Liquidity standards and central bank 
collateral rules are two sides of the same coin. Ignoring this is not sustainable. To the many 
impossibilities in economics is added a new one…” – they are closely related concepts but that does 
not imply that they are identical and have identical purposes. Still, he is right that one cannot ignore 
the interactions and the need to develop policies with their regard.   
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